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Abstract
Firm turnover has recently attracted increased interest in economic research. The
entry of new ﬁrms increases competition and promises eﬃciency gains. Moreover,
changes in the market structure inﬂuence productivity growth, because ﬁrm entry
usually leads to increased innovation. The health care market exhibits important dif-
ferences as compared to other markets, including various forms of market failure and,
as a consequence, extensive market regulation. Thus, the economic eﬀects of entries
and exits in health care markets are less obvious. The following paper studies the
determinants of entry and exit decisions of physicians in the private sector of the out-
patient part of the Austrian health care system. We apply a Poisson panel estimation
to a data set of 2,379 local communities and 121 districts in Austria in the time pe-
riod 2002 - 2008. We are particularly interested in the question how public physicians
(GPs/specialists) and their private counterparts inﬂuence the entrance and exit of pri-
vate physicians. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of existing capacities, measured
by both private and public physician density of the same specialty, on the entry of new
private physicians. On the contrary, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of private
GPs on the entry of private specialists. Interestingly, this cooperation/network eﬀect
also works in the other direction, as a higher density of private specialists increases
the probability of the market entry of private GPs. Based on the results of previous
literature, we thus conclude that private physicians establish networks to cooperate
in terms of mutual referrals etc. Our estimations for market exits basically conﬁrm
the entry results, as higher competitive forces positively inﬂuence the market exit of
private physicians.
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Firm turnover has recently attracted increased interest in economic research. The entry
of new ﬁrms increases competition and encourages eﬃciency gains. Moreover, the induced
changes in the market structure inﬂuence productivity growth, because ﬁrm entry usually
leads to innovation and new technologies. As high entry rates often coincide with high
rates of ﬁrm death, the impact of exits has to be accounted for when analyzing the eﬀect
of market entries. Previous research focused mainly on microeconomic explanations for
ﬁrm entry, mostly derived from the theory of industrial organizations. The following para-
graphs give a brief overview of the relevant literature in industrial organization and health
economics. Moreover, this short review motivates our empirical strategy for analyzing
entries and exits in the outpatient sector of the Austrian health care system.
Generally, we are able to distinguish two main sources of entry, (i) the entry of incum-
bent ﬁrms from other markets (foreign producers or sellers of the same product/service in
other geographic markets), and (ii) the entry of new startup competitors. Most of previous
empirical research on entry behavior is based on data from the manufacturing industry.
Dunne et al. (1988) use data from the U.S. census to examine patterns of entry, survival
and exit of manufacturing ﬁrms in the U.S. from 1963 to 1982. They ﬁnd that diversifying
ﬁrms with new plants, compared to existing capacities, enter the market with the largest
market shares, grow faster after entry and have the highest survival rate. Orr (1974b)
compares the market entry between the banking and manufacturing industries and con-
cludes that the birth of ﬁrms in the banking sector is probably determined by structural
relations, as opposed to the manufacturing industry. Siegfried and Evans (1994) ﬁnd that
new business starters are correlated to the exit of ﬁrms which entered the market through
diversiﬁcation.
With regard to the determinants of market entry, the literature identiﬁes two main in-
centives to enter, namely (i) expected proﬁtability and/or (ii) market growth. Proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms will enter the market if the risk-adjusted anticipated revenues exceed
the expected costs of entry and the expected operating costs after entry. These expec-
tations are always inﬂuenced by present and past proﬁts, and also depend on potential
1entrants in the market. In this line of research, many papers ﬁnd a positive correla-
tion between proﬁtability and net entry (e.g. Hirschey 1981, Chappell et al. 1990 and
Rosenbaum 1993). The second strand of literature focuses on market growth, where the
potential entrant can expect a faster growth rate compared to existing ﬁrms. Empirical
studies generally conﬁrm a positive correlation between growth rates and the entry of new
ﬁrms (see, for instance, Orr 1974a, Hirschey 1981, Chappell et al. 1990 and Rosenbaum
1993).
When investigating market entries of ﬁrms, we also have to account for exits in order to
model total market turnover. Firms leave the market if consumers demand less of a good
or service, or if they earn (too) low proﬁts. The majority of the exit models estimate
multiple linear regression models, and ﬁnd three main incentives to leave the market, (i)
low proﬁts, (ii) market growth and (iii) displacement. Related empirical studies use price-
cost margins as indicators for gross exits, e.g. Dunne/Roberts (1991) and Mayer/Chappell
(1992). Moreover, a steady decrease of demand leads to an exit of ﬁrms, see for example
Duetsch (1984), Dunne/Roberts (1991) and Mayer/Chappell (1992). Finally, incumbents
may exit due to displacement by more eﬃcient new entrants. Caves and Porter (1976)
ﬁnd a positive relation between entry and exit, which is also conﬁrmed in numerous other
studies (Dunne et al. 1988, Geroski 1991 or Sleuwaegen/Dehandschutter 1991).
The entry behavior in the health care sector diﬀers from other industries due to several
market imperfections, including (i) information asymmetries, (ii) quality rather than price
competition, and (iii) speciﬁc regulations of market entry and exit. Bresnahan/Reiss (1988,
1990, 1991) derive a general entry condition depending on the market structure. The basic
idea behind this approach is simple: Competition gets tougher with a growing number
of ﬁrms (and a given population). With additional physicians entering the market, the
proﬁt margins of existing physicians decrease, leading to a higher ”break-even“ population
ratio to cover the entry costs. While this approach requires data of the market structure
and population as key variables for the model, no data on price-cost margins or prices
are required (which are usually not available in the health care industry). Abraham et al.
(2007) extend the Bresnahan-Reiss model and ﬁnd that entry leads to a signiﬁcant increase
in competition in hospital markets, and thus, to a higher consumer welfare. Capps et al.
2(2009), on the other hand, ﬁnd that urban hospital dropouts reduce social welfare, but the
cost savings for the patient exceed the reduction of his welfare. Schaumans and Verboven
(2008) present an empirical entry model for pharmacies and physicians in Belgium, by both
allowing for entry restrictions and strategic complements. They ﬁnd that entry restrictions
directly reduce the number of pharmacies by more than 50%, and also indirectly reduce
the number of physicians by about 7% compared to a free entry situation. Furthermore, a
removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a reduction in the regulated markups of
pharmaceutical prices, would generate a large shift of rents to consumers, without reducing
the availability of pharmacies.
Overall, empirical research on the entry/exit decision in the health care sector is quite
scarce. In the following paper we analyze the entry and exit decisions of physicians working
in the private outpatient sector of the Austrian health care system. The outpatient sector
of the health care system in Austria is characterized by a strict separation of private and
public physicians. Private physicians are free in their location decision while the market
entry for public physicians is strongly regulated by public ﬁnancing agencies. Furthermore,
remuneration policies, beneﬁt catalogs and insurance coverage vary widely between the
private and the public sector. This split in physician labor supply makes it impossible
to study the entry/exit question at an aggregated level without diﬀerentiating between
private and public physicians. On the other hand, our focus on private physicians allows
us to investigate the interaction between the entry/exit decisions of private physicians
and existing capacities of public physicians. While an essential part of the literature in
industrial organization focuses on proﬁts and costs of ﬁrms, information of that kind is not
available for private physicians in Austria. Thus, we apply a model where the entry/exit
decision is related to the market shares of existing (public and private) capacities and the
resulting competitive forces in the health care system. By using information from 2,379
local communities and 121 districts in Austria in the time period 2002 - 2008 we estimate
a Poisson panel data model. We are particularly interested in the question how the given
capacity of public physicians (GPs and specialists) and their private counterparts inﬂuence
the entrance and exit of private physicians. Entry/exit is analyzed for GPs and specialists
as a whole and for the most important groups of specialists.
3Our paper enriches the previous knowledge on physician location decision in several di-
rections. As already mentioned we adjust for diﬀerences in the regulatory framework of
physician supply by focusing on private physicians, while previous studies mainly analyze
physicians as one aggregate. This split allows us to stress the interaction of entry/exit
between and within the private sector and existing public physician capacities. The ﬁnd-
ings from a health care system with a pronounced two-tier-structure adds insights to our
knowledge of physician location from health care systems were physician service the pri-
vate and the public sector simultaneously (e.g. in the US.). While the majority of the
existing literature studies the determinants of physician density, we explicitly focus on
the entry/exit decision. To our knowledge it is the ﬁrst application of a Poisson panel
data model - which is widely recognized in the IO literature - to explain ﬁrms’ entry/exit
behavior to the physicians market.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two gives a brief overview of the outpatient
sector in Austria. Section three develops our empirical model, while section four presents
empirical results and discusses them. Finally, section ﬁve draws selected conclusions.
2 Institutional Framework
In this section we present a brief overview of the institutional design of the outpatient
health care sector in Austria as a necessary prerequisite for our empirical analysis.1 We
start with the demand side. The public health insurance system in Austria acts as the basic
tier of health risk coverage in a two-tiered health care system. Membership in this system
is obligatory both for wage earners in the public and private sector and self-employed
persons (including farmers). Apart from that, individuals with family ties to obligatory
insured and without coverage on their own get free health insurance coverage. Overall, the
public health insurance covers roughly 98.5 per cent of the population, excluding mainly
marginal groups from obligatory public health insurance. The public health insurance sys-
tem is mainly ﬁnanced by income based contributions and is structured on territorial and
occupational principles. Thereby, roughly 80 percent of the Austrian population is covered
1For a more comprehensive description see Hofmarcher/Rack 2006.
4by insurance institutions at the provincial level (the so called ”Gebietskrankenkasse“)2.
From the coverage and ﬁnancing perspective, private health insurance and out-of-pocket
payments constitute the second tier of the Austrian health care system. Roughly 35
percent of the Austrian population have signed contracts with private health insurance
companies, which predominantly oﬀer supplementary coverage in addition to the ﬁrst tier
services and/or widen the freedom of provider choice within the system.
Outpatient health care provision in Austria is mainly provided by self-employed public and
private physicians predominantly working in individual single practices.3 The certiﬁcate
to practice as a physician enables the physician4 either (i) to work in a public or private
hospital (mainly on a salary basis), (ii) to oﬀer medical services as a ”private“ practicing
physician in the outpatient sector of the health care system or (iii) to apply for a contract
with the public health insurance system and work as a public physician. The provision
of public outpatient health care services is based on a beneﬁt-in-kind-scheme without
substantial cost-sharing for physician services. The spatial distribution of public capacities
is based on a location plan which is agreed between the public health insurance funds and
the Physicians’ Chambers of the provinces. This plan speciﬁes the regional distribution of
the physicians workforce based on the health need of relevant population characteristics.5
Public physicians generate income from fee-for-service and lump-sum payments. Lump-
sum payments can be claimed for initial contacts per quarter and for the provision of
basic medical services. The share of lump-sum payments to total physician earnings
varies widely over diﬀerent ﬁelds of specialties. At an aggregate level, it amounts to
about 68 percent for GPs and around 34 percent for specialists. The fee-for-service part
of the remuneration includes earning caps implying decreasing marginal earnings. Public
physicians are allowed to earn extra money by providing additional services beyond the
2The public health insurance system is the predominant ﬁnancing institution of publicly organized
outpatient care.
3In 2010 less than 2 percent of the physicians practices in Austria were organized as group practice.
4Other potential occupations are excluded here.
5The physician contracts are not limited in time and its assignment is based on criteria like waiting time,
professional experience and educational criteria (additional educational eﬀorts). The physician capacity
plan should ensure a suﬃcient provision of medical services based on the existing state of the art. The
individual physician contract is based on bilateral agreements (basic contracts) between the Main Associ-
ation of Social Insurances on the federal level and the Chamber of Physicians and determines important
dimensions of physician services, such as important features of the practice style (oﬃce hours, treatment
guidelines, restrictions for additional occupations etc.) and the physicians’ payment scheme.
5contract.
Physicians working in the private part of the outpatient health care sector are free in
their location decision. Service fees are agreed between the physician and the client,
albeit there exists a recommendation for the physician pricing policy by the Chamber of
Physicians on the provincial level. The treatment costs in the private sector are paid out
of three sources: (i) out of the individual pocket, (ii) by private health insurance, and/or
(iii) by public health insurance. Under certain restrictions, the public health insurance
system reimburses a share of the private physician bill. Currently, roughly 50 percent
of all self-employed physicians have signed a contract with the public health insurance
system, approximately 50 percent of them are GPs. The share of private physicians grows
sharply because of the increasing number of medical graduates and ﬁxed capacities for
public physicians.
For private physicians the location decision has important economic consequences as it
is a speciﬁc investment. The motivations of locating as a private physician are quite
diverse.6 In general, we can identify at least three diﬀerent types of ﬁrm proﬁles: (i)
to act as a private physician as the main job, (ii) to combine the supply of outpatient
private services with the (main) job as a physician in a private or public hospital7, and
(iii) to act as a private physician as a transitional career stage before starting the job as
contracted physician. This transitional stage is counted as waiting time in the process
of applying for the job as contracted physician and therefore improves the probability to
get the job. Clearly, the signiﬁcance of the variables inﬂuencing the entry/exit decision
will depend on the ﬁrm proﬁle. Unfortunately, we are not able to separate between the
diﬀerent ﬁrm proﬁles of private physicians in our empirical study. Thus, we oﬀer a more
general framework for exit and entry decisions.
6See Hofreiter (2005) for details.
7This combination can be chosen by the physician for several reasons, e.g. portfolio eﬀects, supply of
aftercare, enrichment of demand, etc.
63 Model and Data
The majority of previous research on physician location studies the determinants of physi-
cian density. In our study, on the contrary, we explicitly focus on entry and exit in the
physician market. Earlier studies on entry/exit of ﬁrms has considered three diﬀerent
measures, namely (i) net entry/exit rates, which is the diﬀerence in the number of in-
cumbent ﬁrms between time t and t-1, (ii) gross entry rates, only reﬂecting entries, and
thus, neglecting the displacement of other ﬁrms/physicians, and (iii) eﬀective entry/exit
rates, where entries and exits are weighted by their impact (e.g. market share). For the
purpose of our empirical analysis, we will choose net entry/exit rates for several reasons.
While gross entry rates neglect the displacement of existing ﬁrms/physicians (which is an
important factor, because many practices are carried over to young physicians after re-
tirement), net entry/exit rates make sense for the Austrian outpatient health care sector,
as the single practice is the common form, and thus, (approximately) equal market shares
for each practicing physician can be assumed. On the contrary, eﬀective entry/exit rates
should be considered when the market shares of single ﬁrms diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Although
exact data on market shares (or the number of patients, revenues etc.) are not available,
the institutional design and the supply structure of the Austrian health care sector makes
an unequal distribution of market shares unlikely. Thus, we use net entries and exits as
our dependent variable.
To keep our empirical model as simple as possible, we have to make several assumptions
about the market structure. First, we assume that there are homogeneous ﬁrms in the
market, in our case physicians of the same specialty, delivering a homogeneous good (health
care services). Furthermore we assume that entering the market is based on free-entry
competition, which holds true for the private sector of the Austrian outpatient health care
system. Moreover, based on our homogeneous goods assumption, we also assume that
each ﬁrm in the market faces costs of similar size. Accordingly, a ﬁrm only enters the
market if the expected revenues exceed the expected costs, and thus, proﬁts Πi,t ≥ 0. As
proﬁts and costs are not observable, we assume an identical and independent distribution
of proﬁts and costs in the market. Hence, we are able to relate the unobservable proﬁts
7and costs to the market shares, physician densities, in the market i in any time period t.
Thus, if we assume that the density of physicians is below the equilibrium in a market,
demand for physician services will exceed supply, and every physician will earn positive
proﬁts Πi,t ≥ 0. If this assumption holds, additional physicians will enter the market until
supply equals demand of health care services. On the contrary, if there is an excess supply
of physicians in a market, physicians will leave the market due to a loss of Πi,t < 0. Based
on these assumptions the entry equation is given by
Entry(PPi,t) = a0 + a1PGPi,t−1 + a2PSi,t−1 + a3CGPi,t + a4CSi,t (1)
where Entry(PPi,t) denotes the net entrants of various private physicians in market i at
time t. We study the entry of private GPs and specialists as a whole as well as impor-
tant groups of private specialists separately. Thus, our model implicitly assumes that
entering physicians have information on the number of incumbent physicians (supply)
and the population (indicating the potential demand for physician services) in a market.
Therefore, the entry probability into a market can increase or decrease with the density of
private general practitioners (PGPi,t−1), the density of private specialists (PSi,t−1), the
density of contracted general practitioners (CGPi,t) and the density of contracted special-
ists (CSi,t). Private physician densities are lagged in our model, as we would otherwise face
an endogeneity problem (simultaneous decision due to the unregulated location decision).
Furthermore, the lagged density of the same specialty takes into account the displacement
eﬀect. Moreover, we expect that the private physician supply does not inﬂuence public
supply. This assumption is supported by the fact that the private physician capacity does
not inﬂuence the location plans for public physicians.
Taking into account the institutional design of the outpatient sector in Austria (see section
2) we are able to derive hypotheses on the relationships presented in equation (1). In line
with our model we expect a negative relationship between the entry of private physicians
of any given type/specialty and the already existing private capacity of the same type.
We assume that private physicians visits lead to extra costs for the patient which have to
be compared with the extra beneﬁts (e.g. shorter travel and waiting times, better quality,
8enlargement of market choices). This backs our hypothesis of a negative relationship
between the entry of deﬁned private physicians and the existing public capacity of the
same type. In both cases we expect a dominance of the competition eﬀect, meaning
that physicians of the same type are assumed to be substitutes. Taking into account the
ﬁnancing rules, we expect that the degree of substitutability is higher within the private
sector.
The remaining relationships of equation (1) are somehow ambiguous, because the com-
petition (substitution) and complementary eﬀect might cancel out each other, leading to
unclear net eﬀects. Contracted physicians are generally the ﬁrst contact for a patient in
the health care system (Hofmacher/Rack 2006, p. 119), although the Austrian system
is not a typical gate-keeping system. In general, within an accounting period (quarter
of a year), patients are only allowed to contact one contracted general practitioner and
one contracted specialist (per specialty). Alternatively, people can choose a private (non-
contracted) physician. To some extent, contracted general practitioners have a gatekeeper
function, as they are able to control patient ﬂows by referrals, although referrals are not
necessary in most of the cases8. Thus, although compulsory referrals only play a minor
role, referrals still are important to understand the competitive situation in the health care
market. Due to the strong lump-sum elements and decreasing fee-for-service elements per
patient in the payment scheme of public physicians, they may behave as number maximiz-
ers (in terms of the number of patients treated) in order to maximize their own payoﬀs.
Thus, we expect a positive eﬀect of contracted general practitioners’ density on the entry
decision of specialists, as they can be seen as complements. On the contrary, the role of
private general practitioners is less clear, as the eﬀects are ambiguous (Schaumans 2008,
p. 3): On the one hand, (private) general practitioners beneﬁt from the presence of a
specialist as they are able to refer when it would otherwise require a lot of eﬀort to treat
the patient (”referral/cooperation eﬀect“). On the other hand, general practitioners and
specialists partly deliver similar services and are, therefore, competing for patients (”com-
petition eﬀect“). Baumgardner (1988) provides empirical evidence regarding the degree of
8This is the case when several specialists are consulted in one accounting period or when hospital stays
and/or treatment in hospital outpatient departments is required, see Hofmarcher/Rack (2006) for details.
However, for some contracted physicians a referral by a general practitioner is a prerequisite, e.g. for
radiologists, computer tomographies or magnetic resonance.
9labor division among physicians across geographically local markets on an aggregate level
(county basis) and on an individual level. Specialization on the aggregate level is corre-
lated with local demand shifters for medical services, in our case incumbent physicians.
Moreover, public GPs might be substitutes rather than complements to private specialists,
as they might act as proﬁt maximizers and prefer longer treatment processes instead of
referring to a private specialist. This eﬀect could be driven by the institutional design of
the Austrian system, where general practitioners are able to make a referral to a specialist
when necessary. However, as the probability of getting a referral by a contracted general
practitioner is quite low for a private specialist, we expect a negative correlation between
existing contracted capacities and the entry of private physicians. On the contrary, cer-
tain cooperation eﬀects in terms of mutual referrals etc. between private GPs and private
specialists could lead to a positive eﬀect of the density of private GPs on the entrance of
private specialists and a negative eﬀect on the exit decision.
Similarly to equation (1), the exit equation includes the same explanatory variables already
mentioned above. As the exit decision should be based on the same determinants, we
basically expect the opposite sign for our independent variables.
Exit(PPi,t) = a0 + a1PGPi,t−1 + a2PSi,t−1 + a3CGPi,t + a4CSi,t (2)
Since the focus of this paper is on the eﬀect of existing capacities and competitive forces on
the entry and exit decision of private practicing physicians, we choose a simple entry/exit
model to explain the entry/exit behavior in our data set. As we deal with count data,
namely the number of physicians per community, standard OLS regression methods are
not appropriate for several reasons.9 Due to the discrete and non-negative properties of
our explanatory variable, entries and exits, we apply a Poisson regression model to our
data set (see, for instance, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for further details). By including
community ﬁxed eﬀects in our panel regression model, we are able to control for observed
as well as unobserved time-invariant diﬀerences between diﬀerent communities/regions in
our estimations. While this estimator reduces the threat of an omitted variable bias, we
9This includes the existence of heteroskedasticity as well as non-normal conditional distributions (typ-
ically positively skewed with many low-count observations and no observations below zero).
10are not able to estimate the inﬂuence of variables with little within variation, such as the
population, income or the educational level. As our panel data set includes only seven
years, it seems reasonable that such variables do not vary considerably over this short time
period.
To estimate our entry and exit equations, we have to deﬁne relevant geographic levels
mirroring local markets for physicians. Physicians in the Austrian health care system are
not allowed to advertise their services, so the patient’s choice is driven by local information.
Moreover, empirical evidence from surveys shows that patients do not visit a physician
outside their hometown. Schaumans (2008) ﬁnds that 85% of the patients travel less
then ﬁve kilometers for a physician visit in Belgium. Moreover, 94% are used to a ﬁxed
physician, who is located close to the patient location. Thus, the relevant market for our
analysis is the community level, while we use the county level for robustness purposes.
Entry and exit data of physicians and their specialty are self-generated from various
sources10. Our data cover the time period 2002 to 2008 and include 2,379 communities
and 121 districts (including the 23 districts of Vienna). As each geographical unit
constitutes one observation, we analyze a balanced panel with 16,653 (communities)
and 968 (districts) observations, respectively. To compute the density of physicians,
we used population data from the Austrian population census 2001. Due to the lagged
explanatory variables, we lose one year of observations (2002) both at the community
and district level. In 2002, we observe 16,711 physicians in the Austrian outpatient
market, while most of them (10,918) had a contract with at least one of the social health
insurers, whereas the remaining part belongs to the second private tier of the health care
system. Table 1 shows the turnover margin of all physicians in the outpatient sector
of the Austrian health care system. In total, the number of physicians increased by
approximately 12% from 2002 to 2008. Accordingly, the number of contracted physicians
is quite stable over the time period, whereas the number of private practicing physicians
grows considerably (about 42%) in the observed period.
By using 2002 with 5,793 private practicing physicians as our base year, we computed
10G¨ oschl CD MED (2002-2008).
11Table 1: Physicians in Austria 2002-08
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 16,711 17,215 17,475 18,134 18,369 18,475 18,593
Exits Physicians 433 301 466 680 691 731 -
Cumul. Exits Physicians 433 734 1,200 1,880 2,571 3,302 3,302
Entry Physicians - 937 561 1,125 915 797 849
Cumul. Entry Physicians - 937 1,498 2,623 3,538 4,335 5,184
Physician Growth (in%) - 3.02 1.51 3.77 1.30 0.58 0.64
Table 2: Private Physicians 2002-08
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 5,793 6,344 6,590 7,265 7,550 7,664 7,782
Entries Private Physicians - 803 496 987 790 550 674
Change Public to Private Physician - 40 23 74 55 124 57
Cumul. Entries Private Physicians - 803 1,299 2,286 3,076 3,626 4,300
Exits Private Physicians 223 163 223 407 317 442 -
Change Private to Public Physician - 69 110 163 153 243 171
Cumul. Exits Private Physicians 223 386 609 1,016 1,333 1,775 1,775
Private Physician Growth (in%) - 9.51 3.88 10.24 3.92 1.51 1.54
entries, exits and the changes in the contract status (from private to public physicians) for
the following years until 2008. Table 2 shows the turnover margin for private physicians in
Austria with a steady increase in the absolute number of private physicians. Within pri-
vate specialists, the main specialties are internists (18.0%), followed by surgeons (17.3%),
neurologists/psychiatrists (11.1%) and gynecologists (10.5%).
4 Empirical Results
First of all, we present estimations for the net entry and exit of private general practition-
ers (GPs) and private specialists (PS) depending on the prevailing competition within a
certain region (physician densities). For robustness purposes we estimated our equation
explained above both at the community and the district level. In a further step, we split
up the groups of PS by specialty. More precisely, we discuss regressions regarding the
largest four groups of PS, namely internists, surgeons, gynecologists and neurologists.
Empirical results for market entry and exit of private specialists (PS) and general prac-
titioners (GPs) are reported in Table 3. As expected, an entry of a PS is more likely if
12the density of both private and public specialists is low in a region. Similarly, market
exit becomes more likely the higher the density of specialists in a community or county,
respectively. Thus, a low density of specialists seems to indicate the possibility for earning
proﬁts, which makes an entry more likely.
The eﬀect of general practitioners is less clear a priori from a theoretical perspective (see
Schaumans 2008, p. 3). Interestingly, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of existing capacities
in public GPs on the market entry of private specialists and, as expected, a reversed
eﬀect for market exit. On the contrary, private GPs seem to play a diﬀerent role, as their
density is positively related to the market entry of PS (and negatively connected to market
exits of PS). Thus, we conclude that the magnitude of both eﬀects clearly depend on the
institutional conditions, as public and private GPs seem to have a reversed inﬂuence on
the market entry of PS. While the negative eﬀect of public GPs is likely due to the practice
that public GPs tend to refer to public specialists rather than to private ones (and less
likely due to a substitutive eﬀect between public GPs and PS), the positive eﬀect of private
GPs is most likely due to the existence of cooperation networks within the second (private)
tier of the Austrian health care system. In a nutshell, the results are highly robust at the
district level, albeit some coeﬃcients are less signiﬁcant.
The second part of Table 3 (columns 5 to 8) shows the empirical results for market en-
try/exit for private GPs. Most results derived above are conﬁrmed for private GPs. As
expected, the density of private GPs negatively inﬂuences the market entry of new private
GPs. The positive eﬀect of private specialists (both at the community and district level)
on market entry rates once again conﬁrm the network/cooperation eﬀect among private
physicians. Somehow surprisingly, the density of contracted specialists does not appear
signiﬁcant in these models, most likely due to two main reasons, namely that (i) the ef-
fects between diﬀerent specialties might cancel out each other, and (ii) because of the low
within-variation in public physician densities in our sample, as the capacity plan of the
social health insurance fund does hardly change over time.
13Table 3: Estimation for Private Specialists and Private GPs
Dependent Variable PS Entry PS Exit PS Entry PS Exit PGP Entry PGP Exit PGP Entry PGP Exit
Regional Level Community Community County County Community Community County County
PS Densityt−1 -0.853*** 5.704*** -3.275*** 12.714*** 0.273*** 0.729*** 1.127*** 0.186
(0.033) (0.132) (0.224) (1.030) (0.076) (0.146) (0.409) (0.606)
PGP Densityt−1 0.544*** -1.168*** 2.301*** -2.199 -2.652*** 10.299*** -9.805*** 29.579***
(0.079) (0.185) (0.389) (1.479) (0.136) (0.402) (0.931) (2.347)
CS Densityt -0.735*** 1.800*** -2.097*** 6.455*** -0.269 -0.856* -1.003 1.288
(0.116) (0.198) (0.760) (1.290) (0.226) (0.466) (1.110) (2.155)
CGP Densityt -2.255*** 2.345*** -1.769 0.531 -2.584*** 4.594*** -5.583*** 5.478
(0.227) (0.534) (1.441) (3.955) (0.272) (0.850) (2.034) (3.966)
N 3228 1386 720 546 3432 1296 720 624
Log likelihood -8034.633 -4122.506 -1130.462 -390.4111 -3849.258 -1920.224 -793.1736 -313.1966
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗denote 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Variables: PS ... Private specialists, CGP ... Contracted general practitioners, PGP ... Private general practitioners, CS ... Contracted specialists.
1
4Table 4: Estimation for Private Specialists Entry
Dependent Variable PIN Entry PIN Entry PCHIRU Entry PCHIRU Entry PGYN Entry PGYN Entry PNEURO Entry PNEURO Entry
Regional Level Community County Community County Community County Community County
POWN Densityt−1 -4.668*** -12.726*** -3.261*** -9.716*** -7.277*** -17.218*** -6.490*** -18.967***
(0.289) (1.567) (0.297) (1.558) (0.621) (2.670) (0.536) (3.034)
PGP Densityt−1 1.927*** 3.329*** 1.542*** 4.107*** -0.316 0.627 0.489** 1.511
(0.226) (1.101) (0.251) (1.113) (0.302) (1.144) (0.235) (1.069)
COWN Densityt -3.224*** -10.183*** -2.718*** -1.159 -8.662*** -20.039*** -0.857 -6.016
(0.870) (3.905) (0.743) (3.919) (1.952) (6.877) (1.122) (7.987)
CGP Densityt 1.092* -1.470 -0.528 -3.683 -3.682*** -0.671 -2.648*** -1.220
(0.613) (2.960) (0.547) (2.647) (1.022) (3.653) (0.987) (3.813)
N 1386 636 1254 612 1026 582 732 492
Log likelihood -1890.348 -444.1703 -1848.266 -449.4413 -1112.481 -346.9935 -1292.25 -275.3765
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗denote 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Variables: CGP ... Contracted general practitioners, PGP ... Private general practitioners, COWN ... Contracted specialists of the same specialty, PSUR ... Private Surgeons,
PNEURO ... Private Neurologists, PGYN ... Private Gynecologists, PIN ... Private Internists.
Table 5: Estimation for Private Specialists Exit
Dependent Variable PIN Exit PIN Exit PCHIRU Exit PCHIRU Exit PGYN Exit PGYN Exit PNEURO Exit PNEURO Exit
Regional Level Community County Community County Community County Community County
POWN Densityt−1 21.228*** 31.422*** 14.157*** 24.264*** 19.352*** 56.235*** 14.633*** 22.505***
(1.069) (4.178) (0.860) (3.503) (1.712) (9.889) (1.207) (4.260)
PGP Densityt−1 -0.554* -0.643 0.421 1.968 0.119 0.806 -0.034 -1.113
(0.332) (1.354) (0.505) (1.830) (0.838) (3.087) (0.389) (1.567)
COWN Densityt 3.088* -1.588 13.866*** 0.209 7.504* -2.988 -1.340 4.662
(1.621) (5.100) (1.697) (4.950) (3.905) (7.520) (2.404) (5.093)
CGP Densityt 5.370*** 7.128 2.600* 5.942 -5.108* 15.295 3.585** -1.973
(1.518) (6.070) (1.339) (9.240) (2.662) (13.603) (1.528) (8.193)
N 546 480 480 468 312 354 306 390
Log likelihood -971.2281 -197.4255 -1098.809 -205.7376 -444.3943 -125.081 -866.1336 -175.0199
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗denote 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Variables: CGP ... Contracted general practitioners, PGP ... Private general practitioners, COWN ... Contracted specialists of the same specialty, PSUR ... Private
Surgeons, PNEURO ... Private Neurologists, PGYN ... Private Gynecologists, PIN ... Private Internists.
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5In general, the estimations of market exits conﬁrm our results, as an oversupply of both
private and public GPs lead to a higher probability of market exits. Somehow surprisingly,
we ﬁnd a positive impact of private specialists and a weakly negative impact of contracted
specialists on the market exit of private GPs. At ﬁrst sight, this could be interpreted as
evidence against possible network or cooperation eﬀects explained above. However, the
competitive eﬀect of specialists (both private and public) on private GPs critically depend
on the specialty of the specialist within the relevant community. Thus, the eﬀect of the
density of specialists on market entries and exits of private GPs must be taken with care,
as it depends on the specialty. We will shed some light on these ambiguous relationships
between the overall density of private and contracted specialists to private GPs by splitting
up diﬀerent specialties in our following regressions.
In order to investigate certain specialty-speciﬁc eﬀects, we estimated equations (1) and
(2) for internal specialists, surgeons, neurologists and gynecologists in Table 4. As the
results strongly resemble the ﬁndings above, we focus on important diﬀerences in these
estimations. In general, as the number of observations is lower than in our previous
estimations (due to a higher number of communities with no entries/exits of a speciﬁc
specialty), the results appear less signiﬁcant. In particular, the coeﬃcients for public
physicians (both specialists and GPs) are hardly signiﬁcant due to the low within-variation
in these variables. Essentially, we ﬁnd two interesting diﬀerences to the results of Table 3,
namely that (i) the cooperation/network eﬀect between private GPs and specialists does
not appear to be present in the case of gynecologists, and that (ii) private internists seem
to have a complementary relationship not only to private GPs (as expected), but also to
public GPs. Thus, we conclude that referrals to private internists from public GPs might
be more common than to other private specialists. Once again, we have to take the results
for public physicians with caution, as the within-variation in the sample is quite low. Most
of the results at the community level also hold true for the district level, albeit with a
lower signiﬁcance, probably due to higher heterogeneity among districts.
Table 5 represents the estimation results of market exits by specialty. The results ba-
sically validate our ﬁndings from Table 3, conﬁrming the strong competition eﬀect of
private specialists to both private and public specialists of the same specialty. While the
16network/cooperation eﬀect appears less obvious in these estimations (only being signiﬁcant
for the exit of internists), the positive inﬂuence of contracted GPs is basically conﬁrmed,
albeit with one exception: In the case of private gynecologists, a higher density of public
GPs leads to a lower probability of market exit. One possible explanation for this eﬀect
might be that a gynecologist can expect referrals from public GPs in the case of rural
areas, where the transportation costs to the closest public gynecologist would be too high.
However, most conclusions are conﬁrmed for both the community and the district level.
For robustness purposes, we also ran the above estimations with time ﬁxed eﬀects by
including time dummies in our panel model. Although the magnitude of some coeﬃcients
changed slightly, the results and conclusions from our estimations are unaﬀected in this
speciﬁcation. Moreover, we also tried to include spatial eﬀects, where we weighted the
independent variable of communities/districts in the neighborhood by means of a distance
matrix. Once again, the lion’s share of the results was unaﬀected from this change in the
speciﬁcation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we tried to shed some light on entry and exit decisions of private physicians
in the Austrian health care system. As no data is available for revenues, losses and activ-
ities (number of patients treated) we applied a simple entry/exit model at two diﬀerent
levels of aggregation (communities and districts). More precisely, our model considers
both the population (potential demand) and the number of physicians in both the pri-
vate and public sector (competitors) as important factors for the location decision. By
applying a Poisson panel data model with community/district ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcantly negative eﬀect of existing capacities as measured by both private and public
physician density of the same specialty on the entry of new private physicians. Thus,
we conclude that physicians anticipate their future earnings in a market by taking into
account the expected demand for their services. On the contrary, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect of private GPs on the entry of private specialists. Interestingly, this cooper-
ation/network eﬀect also works in the other causal direction, as a higher density of private
17specialists increase the probability of the market entry of private GPs. Based on the re-
sults of previous literature, we thus conclude that private physicians establish networks
to cooperate in terms of mutual referrals etc. Our estimations for market exits basically
conﬁrm the results mentioned above, as higher competitive forces positively inﬂuence the
market exit of private physicians. While our analysis adds to the literature on physician
location decisions in terms of investigating the physicians’ market entry and exit at two
levels of aggregation, it also follows a new approach by applying a Poisson model to this
speciﬁc research question. However, further research seems necessary to investigate the
interdependencies of diﬀerent specialties in the outpatient health care market.
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